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Abstract – Soft errors are faults which are not caused by de-
fective hardware, rather they are induced due to noise or 
transient events. In this paper we describe defensive pro-
gramming and redundancy techniques to detect and deal with 
soft errors. These techniques are categorized according to 
data and control flow errors. 





 Electronic systems, more specifically microcontroller 
systems, are susceptible to transient events and noise due to 
electromagnetic interference or radiation. These issues 
might introduce a sudden change of state in a single bit. 
Errors induced this way lead to erratic behavior. Due to the 
non-deterministic nature of these events, it is impossible to 
predict where and when these errors will occur. 
 In this paper we focus on software-based techniques for 
embedded systems to detect and deal with bit flips due to 
such issues. 
 In the introduction, we define soft errors, identify critical 
areas in a typical microcontroller based system and intro-
duce basic concepts in software-based resilience. Then, in 
Section 2 we describe control flow errors and detection 
techniques. Finally, we describe data flow errors and detec-
tion in Section 3. 
 
A. Soft errors 
 
 Soft errors are erroneous signals or states, which are not 
caused by defect of a particular component or a mistake in 
design or implementation [1]. Rather, a soft error, also 
known as single-event upset, is the change of an instruction 
or a data value in a program, which leads to an erroneous 
state. Soft errors are non-deterministic, as such it cannot be 
ascribed to a particular system state or state transition. Root 
causes of soft errors are due to externally triggered events 
caused by electromagnetic, electrical and radiation issues, 
such as bit flips, noise and transient events. Transient 
events are temporary bursts of energy which are typically 
undesired. For instance overshoot at the rising edge of a 
block signal. Noise and transient events induce bit flips in 
registers and memory locations, which in turn affect system 
state, control flow or lead to incorrect data results. 
 While rebooting the system typically solves the problem, 
this only lasts until a new soft error occurs. Furthermore, 
rebooting interrupts the continuous operation of the system 
and might result in the loss of data or temporary control. 
Moreover, soft errors are typically hard to detect, as it is 
impossible to predict which registers or memory locations 
will be affected. 
 Typically, hardware-based solutions are proposed to deal 
with soft errors, such as shadow registers, watchdog timers, 
triple mode redundancy, etc [2]. However, when hardware 
is in production, it is costly to make changes to its design. 
Software solutions are typically less costly, especially 
when a solution is introduced after the hardware is pro-
duced [3]. 
 
B. Critical areas 
 
 Soft errors can be classified according to the resulting 
effect. This effect depends on the place of the fault in the 
underlying hardware of the microcontroller-based system.  
 On the one hand, when a soft error affects the data mem-
ory, it typically results in corruption of data. Data flow 
errors are also introduced when values from (or pointers to) 
the data memory region are loaded in registers and a bit flip 
occurs on that particular register.  
 On the other hand, when the instruction pointer becomes 
corrupted, soft errors have introduced a fault in the control 
flow of the microcontroller. Instruction pointer corruption 
has multiple potential causes:  
 (1) a bit flip might occur at the instruction pointer regis-
ter.  
 (2) When calling a function, the current instruction 
pointer is pushed onto the stack. When the function returns, 
the instruction pointer is popped from the stack and placed 
in the instruction pointer register. This is called the return 
address and this address might be corrupted when that 
particular memory region on the stack undergoes a bit flip. 
 (3) If the stack pointer, this is the register containing the 
address of the current stack frame, is corrupted, the current 
function context becomes corrupted. Furthermore, as the 
value of the address of the previous frame is also stored on 
the stack, the entire stack call chain becomes invalid. 
 (4) When calling into a function, this is effectively im-
plemented as jumping to the memory address where the 
function has been defined. However, when the value of the 
address of the function has been altered in the program 
memory, this will result in executing arbitrary instructions. 
These instructions might be part of the function, or lie 
outside the function scope. When an arbitrary instruction in 
the function is executed first, the function itself might not 
be correctly initialized or missed some critical operations. 
Outside the function scope, another distinction can be made 
in executing instructions defined by the programmer or 
executing in an undefined region of the program memory. 
For instance when jumping to an unintended function. On 
the other hand, when the address lies outside the defined 
program memory range, the instruction pointer will execute 
undefined behavior. 
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 (5) When the destination address is computed, a jump 
might have an incorrect destination address when one of 
the operands is altered by a bit flip. 
 (6) Conditional branches are susceptible to soft errors in 
two manners. One the one hand, as with (4) the destination 
address of the alternative condition might have been cor-
rupted. On the other hand, the condition on which the ap-
propriate branch has to be decided might be corrupted. This 
can be ascribed to a bit flip in the register which contains 
the arithmetic and logic operation flags. 
 
C. Software-based resilience 
 
 When dealing with soft errors, the particular nature of 
these errors requires a meticulous implementation of soft-
ware-based techniques to obtain resilience. As any register, 
in particular the instruction pointer and stack pointer, or an 
arbitrary value in data memory and program memory re-
gions are susceptible to soft errors, the problem might 
manifest in any value or instruction.  
 Consequently, when techniques dealing with these issues 
are applied on the level of individual instructions, func-
tions, modules or the system, they should be applied to any 
given instruction, function or module. Or else these tech-
niques will not cover the scope of the complete system and 
soft errors will remain undetected and uncorrected. Em-
bedded software techniques dealing with soft errors can be 
put into three categories: defensive programming tech-
niques, redundancy and hybrid solutions involving hard-
ware. 
 Defensive programming is a design technique at function 
level to ensure correct function execution under unforeseen 
conditions. In general, the programmer reduces the number 
of assumptions and tries to handle all possible error states. 
Assumptions on data are implemented as assertions in 
preconditions and postconditions.  
 Preconditions are conditions which should hold true 
when the function is entered. For instance these include 
valid ranges of input values, the necessary memory reser-
vation, particular locks obtained or the system is in a spe-
cific global state, which is required to execute the function. 
 Postconditions are conditions which will hold true when 
the function exits and returns to its calling context. For 
instance these include particular ranges of output values, 
freeing or obtaining a specific memory chunk, obtaining or 
releasing a certain lock or putting the system in a particular 
state. 
 In defensive programming, preconditions and postcondi-
tions are defined in a set of assertions [4], which are appro-
priately checked when entering and exiting a function. If 
any of these assertions fail, an error is raised. 
 Redundancy is a general concept, which can be applied 
at the level of values, functions, modules or even the sys-
tem.  
 At the level of values, redundancy can be implemented 
on the one hand as maintaining copies of values. Multiple 
storage is effective as the non-deterministic nature of soft 
errors implies that the probability of a common error in a 
value is virtually non-existent. However, the cost of redun-
dancy is reflected in multiplying the size of the memory 
needed every time for every additional copy. On the other 
hand, storing the entire value is unnecessary as techniques 
such as parity or cyclic redundancy checks allow to check 
the integrity of a particular value with a minimal overhead 
in storage. 
 Redundancy at the function level can be applied as a 
function can be identically implemented or implemented 
with similar externally observable behavior. By executing 
both functions and comparing the results it is possible to 
detect a mismatch caused by a soft error between the two 
implementations of the functions. Alternatively, instead of 
duplicating the entire function, function arguments and 
return values can be duplicated in the function header itself. 
By checking the values of the original parameter and the 
copied parameter, soft errors will be detected.  
  
II. CONTROL FLOW ERRORS 
  
 Control flow errors are soft errors which result in a cor-
rupted instruction pointer or lead to unexpected execution 




 When using defensive programming at function scope by 
validating preconditions, starting to execute the function in 
a faulty state is signaled. Furthermore by asserting the 
postconditions, soft errors on function completion will also 
be detected. Combined, these predicates will signal the 
execution of unexpected paths in the embedded software. 
 Function redundancy can be implemented by replicating 
the function as a whole or duplicating function parameters 
and return values. By asserting the correspondence of the 
results, soft errors introduced in a single function scope are 
detected. An alternative is to use a different implementa-
tion of the function with similar external behavior to avoid 
common-mode errors, i.e. errors with a common cause. 
 In order to detect an astray instruction pointer, function 
tokens can be introduced [5]. A function token is a constant 
value assigned to the function at compile-time. Before the 
function is called, the value of the function token is pushed 
onto a stack data structure. When entering and leaving the 
function scope, the top value is compared with the function 
token. If they do not correspond, the instruction pointer 
was not supposed to contain an address of the function 
scope. Mark that, when leaving the function the value is 
popped from the stack.  
 A proof of concept of these three techniques at function 
level has shown that they are complementary to each other. 
Defensive programming is able to signal a faulty state 
while executing the function. Whereas function redundancy 
is able to detect soft errors within the range of expected 
values. Finally, function tokens allow to detect erratic be-
havior of the instruction pointer. The same stack is used to 
push the function address which serves as the function 
token, as well as the arguments and return values. Defen-
sive programming is implemented as assertions on the 
expected boundary conditions when entering and leaving 
the function. 
 
B. Conditional branches  
 
 Conditional branches allow to execute different paths in 
the program. When soft errors affecting the decision are 
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introduced, these lead to a faulty state and execution path 
for the rest of the program. Therefore special consideration 
is given to the registers, variables and addresses affecting 
the condition. Introducing redundancy at condition check-
ing covers the condition code register [3]. In Figure 1, the 
decision tree is shown. By duplicating decision and address 
variables and comparing their result the entire conditional 







Fig. 1. Conditional branch duplication 
 
 
C. Program memory  
 
 Although the techniques in Subsection B and C are pro-
found, redundancy techniques and explicit assertions intro-
duce overhead which is typically a criterion to minimize in 
embedded systems. There are two programming techniques 
which deal with an astray instruction pointer. They affect 
the program memory directly without affecting the run-
time behavior or required memory. 
 On the one hand, unused locations in the program mem-
ory are potentially dangerous when an astray instruction 
pointer contains such an address. Filling these locations 
with “no operation” instructions avoids unwanted behav-
ior [5]. Before the end of the program memory is reached 
an error handling routine can be provided to catch the lost 
instruction pointer and take an appropriate corrective ac-
tion. 
 On the other hand, immediately calling the error handler 
at every unused memory location is an improvement to the 
previous technique. However, this requires that microproc-
essor architecture supports branches to every program 
memory location in a single program word. 
 Both techniques will not affect the run-time behavior in 




 An interrupt is an external signal which results in chang-
ing the value of the instruction pointer. It is an asynchro-
nous event, which is hard to differentiate from a soft or 
transient error. Two complementary precautions deal with 
unintentionally invoked interrupts by soft errors. 
 Keeping the interrupt service routine as short as possible 
is a design directive in order to properly detect as many 
interrupts as possible and avoid interrupt masking of a 
lower or equal priority level. However, this design directive 
also has its merit in order to mitigate the effects of a soft 
error induced interrupt. When an interrupt is raised, the 
interrupt is only registered and the normal execution is 
resumed as soon as possible. When the state machine 
checks if any interrupts have been registered, it can per-
form additional checks, to see if an interrupt effectively 
was raised by an intended external signal rather than a soft 
error induced interruption. 
 Microcontroller systems include a number of interrupt 
vectors, which might not be used in an application. How-
ever, if a soft error is introduced these interrupt vectors 
might be called and subsequently unexpected instructions 
are executed. In order to prevent the unexpected behavior, 
unused interrupt vectors can be implemented with a call to 
an error handling routine.  
 As in Subsection II.C these techniques do not affect the 
normal run-time behavior and do not have an impact on 
memory usage. 
 
III. DATA FLOW ERRORS 
 
 Data flow errors are soft errors which affect data values 
or data pointers. These can lead to erroneous data or miss-
ing data. Furthermore if the data is used to decide upon a 
transition to a new state, data flow errors might lead to a 
faulty state. Data flow error solutions typically involve 
redundancy, either in space (duplication, error correction 
codes) [6] or in time (multiple input read). 
 
A. Data memory 
 
 Variables can be duplicated and synchronized during 
execution. Data flow errors are detected when the values 
are out of sync. 
 When storing data, data can be duplicated in the same 
physical memory system or duplicated across different 
non-volatile memory systems. Though some hardware 
technologies are more susceptible to soft errors of a spe-
cific kind than other non-volatile memory systems, the 
random nature of soft errors ensures there is a very low 
probability that the duplicated data will also be affected. 
Therefore there is no reason related to soft errors to dupli-
cate the data across multiple memory systems. However, if 
hardware would be damaged permanently, data integrity of 
both original and duplicated values is compromised. 
 
B. Error detection codes 
 
 Variable duplication has a severe impact on the usage of 
memory. Namely, a multiple of the minimal amount is 
needed depending on the number of duplicated values.  
 In contrast, error detection codes use less memory, with 
guarantees that a specific number of bit errors depending 
on the algorithm can be detected. For instance a parity bit is 
able to detect any odd number of bit errors. On the other 
hand, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is used exten-
sively in data networks and is suited to detect multiple bit 
errors in a single data word. 
 
C. Input and output 
 
 When capturing a digital signal, the current voltage level 
on the input pin might be the result of a transient error. In 
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order to prevent reading a faulty level, a burst of reads is 
needed to capture the signal. The majority of levels read 
can be considered as the correct level to capture. 
 Considering a continuous analog signal, a burst of reads 
might give an average level of the analog value. However, 
when interested in the continuous behavior, it might be 
more interesting to check if the next value is in the range of 
the maximum slew rate when considering the previous 
value. 
 Finally when generating an output, the output value is 
stored in a register resembling the value of the output pin. 
These I/O registers can be regularly overwritten in order to 
prevent any soft errors occurring at that register. 
 
 
IV. FUTURE WORK 
 
A. Design patterns 
 
 A first direction of future work is to introduce design 
patterns for the strategies in this paper. A design pattern is 
an informal way of documenting a solution to a design 
problem. A pattern does not only describe why the pro-
posed solution to a particular problem is considered a good 
one, it also gives an example and explains the relationship 
of the pattern to other patterns. A pattern language for 





 A second direction of future work is located in the field 
of the effect of the strategies proposed onto the embedded 
system. Redundancy is a common solution in both control 
and data flow errors. However, a typical characteristic of 
redundancy is that it requires more memory. This also 
increases the probability of the occurrence of a soft error.  
This trade-off should be careful considered and more data 
is needed to decide upon the extent of duplication needed, 
its cost and problems associated with it. Currently, imple-
mentations of the various techniques are developed which 
will be evaluated. 
 
C. Corrective actions 
 
 Finally, when detecting a soft error, a corrective action 
must be taken. There are several options including, reset-
ting the system, putting the system in a generic safe state or 
performing error recovery. These actions can be performed 
by techniques such as voting mechanisms, applying correc-
tion codes, introducing transactional behavior or reverting 




 In defensive programming, the concept of a condition, 
which should hold true at specific moments during execu-
tion is called an invariant. As it is impossible to continu-
ously monitor all these assumptions pragmatic approaches 
should be adopted when dealing with soft errors. For in-
stance, loop invariants could be asserted every time the 
loop condition is checked. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Hardware-based solutions to deal with soft errors are 
costly and must be introduced during design. Alternatively, 
software-based solutions can be implemented afterwards 
and do not require any additional resources.  
 This paper describes software techniques to detect soft 
errors in data and control flow. By applying these tech-
niques, embedded software resilience can be improved.  
 First, following guidelines concerning unused program 
memory locations and interrupt vectors do not require any 
investment, while providing a basic solution for astray 
instruction pointers. 
 Secondly, redundancy techniques can be applied at any 
given level, both in control flow and data. However, these 
techniques have an impact on the memory footprint.  
 Finally, when defensive programming is applied at the 
function level, it allows to detect erroneous behavior early 
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